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Abstract A growing number of empirical studies find a relationship between
the outsourcing of activities and a long term loss of firm productivity growth.
The paper addresses this outsourcing productivity paradox by examining the
connection between total outsourcing and organisational innovation. We
present a model of organisational innovation in which managers raise produc-
tive efficiency by identifying organisational architectures that more effectively
integrate value-adding activities and administrative routines. As part of this
process, managers can internally or externally source an activity. Simulations
of the model show that large scale outsourcing restricts the scope for future
organisational innovation, leading to lower productivity growth. The findings
accord with the empirical data and provide a salutary warning for managers
and policy-makers about the long term implications of total outsourcing.
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1 Introduction
Outsourcing involves the transfer of goods and services production, previously
carried out internally, to an external provider (Domberger 1998). The term
‘outsourcing’ can cover many areas and activities, in manufacturing as well as
services. While much of the media attention has tended to focus on foreign
outsourcing by manufacturers and on call centres (so-called ‘offshoring’), the
vast majority of outsourcing is done ‘locally’ within the US and within Europe,
and the vast majority of outsourcing is by services firms, not manufacturers
(Willcocks and Plant 2003).
Recent empirical studies have highlighted the existence of an outsourcing
productivity paradox (Görzig and Stephan 2002; Bengtsson and von Hartman
2005; Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Gianelle and Tattara 2007). In the short-
run, outsourcing firms are able to reduce costs. In the long-run, firms that
engage in outsourcing suffer lower productivity growth than firms that do not
engage in outsourcing. How is this paradox to be explained? In this paper
we explore the impact of outsourcing on organisational innovation. Organ-
isational innovation is a key source of long term productivity growth. The
argument that organisational innovation drives economic growth is a central
theme in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776) and, more recently,
has been re-emphasised by Chandler (1980) and Harberger (1998). The central
message of this paper is that it is not the ownership of activities that matters,
per se, but how activities are controlled and integrated. Empirically, we know
that the vast majority of outsourcing takes the form of ‘total outsourcing’
relationships. In this relationship the outsourcing firm has little or no control
over the outsourced activity for long contractual periods. This severely limits
the scope for ongoing organisational innovation and, hence, has a direct impact
on long run productivity growth.
We explore the relationship between total outsourcing, organisational in-
novation, and long run productivity using a model of organisation innovation.
In the model, organisational innovation is the search for new organisational
architectures that more effectively bring together the externalities that exist
between value-adding activities. Externalities exist between a set of related
R&D, design, production, and marketing activities within a firm (Langlois
2002), and between the activities of firms along the supply chain (Jacobides
and Winter 2005). Organisational innovation involves experimentation with
(a) different combinations of value-adding activities, and (b) the insourc-
ing/outsourcing of activities. Over time, firms experiment with different or-
ganisational designs that recombine activities in new and novel ways, thereby
raising the total factor productivity of its managerial, labour, and capital inputs.
They also experiment with the sourcing of activities. A firm must identify
and control core R&D, design, production, and marketing activities for which
there are strong externalities. Seen in this light, the make/buy decision is
not a question of ownership but of control. What matters is the outsourcing
relationship, and how this positively or negatively affects the firm’s capacity
to engage in future organisational change that reorganises activities (held
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in house or externally). Information technology is a key factor that affects
the feasibility and the relative costs and benefits of outsourcing. The model
therefore considers the effect on outsourcing strategies of new, internet-based
IT systems that significantly lower the costs of external transaction costs.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature
on the potential benefits and potential problems of outsourcing. This draws
on research conducted in a number different discipline areas; transactions cost
economics, strategic management, information systems, services innovation,
and industrial organisation. These highlight a set of potential benefits that
arise from cost reduction, specialisation, and substitution. In terms of potential
costs, managers face problems in effectively monitoring contracts, with un-
foreseen transaction costs, in identifying core and non-core competences, and
with estimating the externalities that exist between activities. Section 2 also
reviews the empirical studies by Görzig and Stephan (2002), Bengtsson and
von Hartman (2005), Lacity and Willcocks (1998), and Gianelle and Tattara
(2007) on the relationship between outsourcing and long term productivity.
Section 3 examines the connection between total outsourcing, organisa-
tional innovation, and productivity growth. We introduce the key concepts of
organisational architecture and organisational innovation, based on a modular
theory of the firm. This theory is founded on the twin principles of increasing
specialisation and the modularisation of complex organisational structures.
Increasing the modularity of an organisational structure leads to improve-
ments in efficiency through specialisation. As we will see, it also enables a
firm to realise system economies. By restricting the client’s ability to engage
in organisational innovation, total outsourcing reduces its effective search.
Increasing the extent of total outsourcing increases the possibility of lock-
in to an inefficient organisational architecture, negatively impacting long run
productivity.
Section 4 describes the model that is used to investigate the complex rela-
tionship between organisational innovation, total outsourcing, and productiv-
ity growth. It specifies the alternative strategies for organisational innovation
available to the firm, the way in which learning is modelled, the decision rules
for IT adoption, and the outsourcing of activities. Section 5 discusses the results
of simulations performed on the model. Section 6 concludes and points to new
directions for further research.
2 Potential benefits and problems of outsourcing
There has been a rapid increase in the level outsourcing, across a wide range of
areas and activities, in manufacturing and services over the last two decades.
A notable growth area is the externalisation of information technology (IT)
services. From 1989 to 2006, the global IT outsourcing market grew from an
estimated US$3 billion to just over US$250 billion (Willcocks and Lacity 2006).
A recent Forrester study of US firms (McCarthy 2002) indicates that computer
services account for 26% of all outsourcing (Fig. 1). The IT outsourcing














Fig. 1 Variety of activities being outsourced. Source: McCarthy 2002
revolution has been fuelled by significant developments in countries such as
India and China (as new entrant IT providers) and by the adoption of pack-
aged organisational software; e.g. office based systems, Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) and Customer Relationship Management (CRM).
IT based activities represent a significant proportion of office services, ac-
counting for 53% of all outsourcing by US firms. This includes basic back-office
activities such as payrolls. The remaining share is made up of advanced, back-
office activities such as legal services, and client-facing front-office activities
in sales and marketing. Sources such as Indobase and Gartner highlight the
present and future growth of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO).
2.1 Potential benefits
Research on outsourcing can be found in four different literatures: transaction
cost economics, strategic management, information systems, and services in-
novation. Three key potential benefits are highlighted in these literatures, and
are consistently identified as key drivers in CEO surveys such as the Morgan
Chambers study of the top 100 FTSE firms (Morgan Chambers 2001) and the
Outsourcing Institute’s study of outsourcing in Japan (Outsourcing Institute
2005). These are: the reduction of direct operating costs, specialisation in core
competences, and the substitution of non-core competences with inputs from
a specialist provider.
Transaction cost economics dates back to Coase (1937). It predominantly
focuses on the reduction of direct operating costs, i.e. the wage bill and man-
agerial administrative overheads. Williamson (1985) argues that, ultimately,
the sourcing decision depends on the scope for cost reduction and the degree
of asset specificity. A firm should outsource activities when this minimises the
sum of production costs and transaction costs. This is likely to be when the
level of asset specificity is low.
The outsourcing productivity paradox 201
Where transactions cost economists focus on the reduction of direct op-
erating costs, other scholars highlight the benefits that can arise through
specialisation and substitution. First, an outsourcing firm can focus and devote
more resources to developing its core competences. Second, a substitution
effect arises when an outsourcing firm replaces its non-core competences with
inputs from a specialist provider with greater knowledge depth, which invests
more in these competences, is more efficient, and is able to offer higher salaries
to attract more highly skilled staff.
The nature and potential impact of client–provider interactions has received
much attention from services innovation scholars. Of particular interest is the
‘co-production thesis’. It is argued that knowledge intensive business service
(KIBS) providers do more than provide higher quality inputs; they engage
with their clients in the co-production of new knowledge and material artefacts
(Gallouj and Weinstein 1997; Antonelli 1998; Sundbo 1998; Preißl 2000). For
the client and the KIBS provider to interact in this way, there must be a semi-
permeable boundary between the organisations. Developments in the skills
and competences of one will affect a change in the skills and competences of
the other (Gallouj and Weinstein 1997).
2.2 Total outsourcing relationship
The co-production thesis raises a most important issue. Co-production is
founded on the existence of an ‘integrated outsourcing’ relationship. This
integrated outsourcing relationship lies at one end of a spectrum of client–
provider relationships. At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the ‘total
outsourcing’ relationship. In practice, the vast majority of contracts take the
form of total outsourcing relationships. This fact has been neglected by services
innovation scholars. Indeed, the issue of control is generally ignored in the
outsourcing literature. Yet it is of vital importance to any discussion about the
long run impact of outsourcing on productivity.
Total outsourcing is by far the most common form of client–provider
relationship. Total outsourcing involves the complete hiving-off of one or
more activities by the outsourcing firm for a set period of time. Control of
the outsourced activities, and their administration, are passed over to the
service provider—total outsourcing involves the sourcing of between 80% and
100% of an activity from a client to a supplier (Willcocks and Lacity 2006).
As a consequence of the strict division of labour between client and service
provider, there is little or no interaction between provider–client knowledge
and competence bases. There is certainly no co-production. The relationship is
contractual. The provider undertakes to deliver a pre-specified set of inputs or
services to the client at a set price and quality for a number of years.
As we shall see, the nature of the total outsourcing relationship is crucial to
the short and long term impact of outsourcing on the client firm. Substituting
expensive in-house labour with cheaper provider labour may well deliver a
short term cut in the wage bill and in the administration of those (formerly
in-house) activities. If loss of client control under total outsourcing restricts its
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capacity to engage in organisation innovation and restructuring—an important
source of TFP improvement—then outsourcing may well have a negative
impact on its long run productivity growth.
2.3 Problems setting up and managing contracts
Managers face a set of practical problems in trying to define core competences,
and in the drawing up and monitoring contracts. Transaction cost economists
highlight the problem of hold-up. This arises because the client and the
provider need to make relationship-specific investments that are of little or
no value outside that relationship. Given the problem of writing complete
contracts prior to making these investments, there may be underinvestment in
external sourcing. This has prompted a theoretical debate about the specifica-
tion of contracts (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1999), contractual
protection (Klein et al. 1978), breach of contract (Edlin and Reichelstein 1996),
and renegotiation (Hart and Moore 1988; Aghion et al. 1994).
The strategic management and IS literatures discuss the practical problems
involved in identifying ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ competences. They also discuss
how managers invariably underestimate the positive externalities that arise
due to interactions between particular sets of business activities. In-depth
individual case studies, such as McIvor (2003) and Willcocks and Plant (2003),
reveal inconsistencies and a lack of clarity in the way managers interpret core
competences, and challenge the usefulness of core competence theory as a
basis of outsourcing. Activities that were believed to be non-core are later
realised to be core, or, alternatively, to directly impact on core activities.1
Willcocks and Plant’s study of 78 US, European and Australasian organ-
isations identifies some (all too rare) examples of successful core compe-
tence management at Dell, Cisco, Direct Line and Tesco. Dell focused on
research and development, information management, and the customer buying
process while outsourcing input production to suppliers. Tesco’s focus on
core activities meant it decided to control its online shopping in-house but
externalised online banking, which it perceived to be non-core. Direct Line
adopted a similar approach regarding the development of Jamjar.com and
Directline.com. Against these success stories, Willcocks and Plant discuss a
number of well publicised outsourcing failures. These include the outsourcing
of inventory management systems and internet development. Leading firms,
such as Alamo, J.S.Sainsbury, Cable and Wireless, and J.P. Morgan Chase,
mistakenly perceived these to be non-core activities and subsequently needed
to re-insource.
The management and IS literatures also discuss unforeseen transaction
costs involved in drawing up and managing contracts, and the problems and
1Managers are presumably not helped by fundamental disagreements about what actually con-
stitutes a core competence. For example, Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) definition is based on
enhanced customer value, competitor differentiation, and extendability. By contrast, transaction
cost writers, such as Reve (1990), use asset specificity to define core competences.
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costs involved in reversing sourcing decisions. IT is an attractive candidate
for outsourcing for many small and medium sized firms because it is one of
the most expensive parts of the organisation to establish and maintain (Earl
1996). Unfortunately, the potential cost savings of IT outsourcing can be
(and often are) eaten away by unforeseen costs that are extremely difficult
to quantify at the outset, but which are essential to the make-buy decision.
These include initial vendor search and contracting set-up costs, transition
costs involved in transferring in-house IT activities to a vendor, and the costs
of managing an ongoing contract. The latter is usually the largest cost. It
includes the monitoring of IT vendors, ongoing bargaining and sanctioning
(where necessary), and negotiating necessary contract changes (Barthelemy
2001). Further costs are incurred when a contract is unsuccessful. These involve
finding a new vendor or, alternatively, re-insourcing IT.
Barthelemy’s survey of 50 IT outsourcing firms found that 14% deemed
the outsourcing operation to be a failure (Barthelemy 2001). Yet, despite
this, he identified strong managerial inertia to re-insourcing. When managers
initially decide to outsource an IT system, they generally do not consider
the possibility of, or mentally prepare themselves for, re-insourcing at a later
date. Barthelemy found that managers prefer to search for another vendor
rather than consider re-insourcing. Additionally, IT is a lumpy investment with
high sunk costs. It is difficult to rehire skilled IT staff, and costly to purchase
new IT systems and train general staff. Maintaining external contracts is also
expensive, however. Miozzo and Grimshaw (2005) observe that IT suppliers
are not turn-key; they are not easily substituted because markets are thin. What
is more, as outsourcing firms lose internal IT skills over time (as a consequence
of staff turnover and/or the technology frontier continuing to move ahead), so
monitoring contracts becomes more difficult and more expensive.
The same set of issues are raised in research on the outsourcing of non-
IT services (see, for example, Hinks and Hanson 2001; Domberger 1998;
Steinmueller 2003). With regards to R&D, Prencipe (1997) highlights the
danger of outsourcing complex production and advanced R&D activities,
based on simple notions of core and non-core competences. Outsourcing can
seriously impair the development of new (core) technological competences in
the future. For this reason, Brusoni et al. (2001) emphasise the importance of
retaining control over R&D, and the ability to coordinate the R&D, design,
and manufacturing activities of suppliers.
2.4 Long term productivity
Given the amount of attention that outsourcing has attracted, surprisingly little
empirical research has been conducted on the long term effects of outsourcing.
Further, those studies that do exist tend to focus on manufacturing rather than
services. Given the importance of services in developed economies, and the
fact that outsourcing within service sectors accounts for the majority of all
outsourcing, this is unfortunate.
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A limited number of empirical studies have investigated the short term and
long term effects of outsourcing on costs and productivity growth. Of particular
note here are Görzig and Stephan’s (2002) panel study of German manufac-
turing companies, Bengtsson and von Hartman’s (2005) study of outsourcing
by medium and large size Swedish firms, Lacity and Willcocks’s (1998) detailed
study of IT outsourcing by US and UK firms, and Gianelle and Tattara’s (2007)
panel study of outsourcing by textile, clothing and footwear manufacturers in
the Veneto region of Italy. In addition, a number of individual case studies
exist in the strategic management literature and in the information systems
literature.
Görzig and Stephan (2002) is one of the earliest attempts to estimate the
effects of outsourcing on plant productivity using micro-data. The study exam-
ines a panel dataset of 43,000 German manufacturing companies for the period
1992–2000. Görzig and Stephan estimate firm performance, measured by the
returns per employee and the return on sales.2 The analysis considers material
inputs, external contract work, and services outsourcing. Estimates include
both a between-firm specification (where all observations are averaged for
each firm), and a within-firm specification (where they control for unobserved
heterogeneity and exclude all time-invariant variables). The former estimated
model is interpreted as the long run model, and the latter as the short run
model. In the long run, Görzig and Stephan find a negative and statistically
significant correlation between outsourcing and productivity. In the short
run they also find a negative, statistically significant correlation for services
outsourcing and productivity.
Bengtsson and von Hartman (2005) examine a survey sample of 267 medium
and large size firms in Sweden.3 They found that outsourcing companies
enjoy cost reductions in the short run, principally through cutting the wage
bill. However, they find that administrative overheads (i.e. management and
administrative costs) increased. This is a consequence of the more complex
logistics required to manage the interaction between the outsourced activities
and in-house activities. Even with more complex logistics in place, outsourcing
firms report a strongly negative impact on lead times, delivery times, and
accuracy. Bengtsson and von Hartman report that these logistics problems
were more common amongst companies that outsource to low-cost countries.
Turning to the literature in IT outsourcing, one would expect to find a
discussion of the impact of different outsourcing relationships on the suc-
cess/failure of outsourcing IT to specialist KIBS suppliers. Certainly a sig-
nificant number of high profile, private and public sector organisations have
chosen to outsource their IT activities over the last couple of decades. Promi-
2These are used as indicators of productivity. Each makes use of the gross operating surplus
(GOS). The first is GOS divided by employment, the second is GOS divided by gross production.
3The analysis is based on a set of written questionnaires collected from 267 firms. All firms
have 50< employees and are drawn from the ISIC sectors 28–35: metal goods, machinery,
office equipment and computers, other electronics, telecoms, instrumentation, and the automotive
industry.
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nent examples in the private sector include Eastman Kodak, Caterpillar, Rolls-
Royce, MacDonald Douglas, JS Sainsbury, Continental Bank, and Continental
Tires. Yet, while these deals have received much media attention, only the
general aims and criteria of the arrangements have been disclosed by official
parties. Take, for example, the first major total outsourcing deal between
Eastman Kodak and IBM. Officially, all that is stated is that this relationship
started in 1989, when Eastman Kodak chose IBM to handle the vast majority
of its data handling arrangements (Polilli 1989), and according to an IBM
press release (18th October 2005), the relationship continues to evolve with
IBM delivering a range of business support functions. Lack of information is
also striking in relation to Nestle’s US$500 million deal with IBM, and the
US$1 billion deal between the British retailer Sainsbury’s and the IT vendor
Accenture (2000–2005). Writing in the Financial Times, Alan Cane suggests
that this lack of information is due to the frighteningly large percentage of IT
sourcing projects that end in failure: they are either late, over budget, do not
work, or do not meet the client’s needs (Cane 2007). Cane suggests that both
the vendor and the client have too much at stake, in terms of reputation and
customer confidence, to publicly air these failures.4
To our knowledge, Lacity and Willcocks (1998) is the only empirical study
to have considered the effect of different sourcing arrangements on the
success/failure of IT outsourcing. Their analysis is based on a detailed sample
survey that was completed by 40 US and UK companies. They define total
outsourcing as an arrangement where 80% or more of the IT activity is passed
to an external supplier. Integrated sourcing refers to clients who use external
suppliers but retain 20% to 80% of IT activities in-house.5 Total insourcing is
where as at least 80% of the IT activity is controlled by the client.
Lacity and Willcocks consider clients’ perceptions of success, defined in
terms of financial returns. With respect to reducing costs, total outsourcing
arrangements were only successful in 29% of cases. By contrast, 67% success
was reported for total IT insourcing, and 85% success for IT integrated
outsourcing. The size of the IT activity or function being outsourced appears
to have no impact on success or failure. Rather, the critical success factors
identified by Lacity and Willcocks are (1) the length of contract, and (2) the
type of contract that is drawn up. Firms that award contracts of 4 or less
years achieve significantly greater cost savings than firms that award contracts
of more than 4 years. By far the worst performance was achieved by firms
awarding contracts for 7 years or longer. This finding is particularly important
given that the overwhelming number of total outsourcing arrangements are
long terms contracts of between 7 and 10 years. With regards to the type of
contract that is drawn up, Lacity and Willcocks find that detailed ‘fee-for-
4The notable exception that proves the rule is the legal action currently being taken by British Sky
Broadcasting (BSkyB) against Electronic Data Systems (EDS). This is for damages in relation to
a contract for a call centre and a Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.
5Another label frequently used in the information systems literature is ‘selective outsourcing’.
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service arrangements’ have a 91% success rate; far higher than alternative
arrangements.
Other writers in the information systems literature have been critical of
companies who outsource large scale, long term IT projects with single sup-
pliers. Weill and Broadbent (1998), highlight the loss of strategic flexibility
and effectiveness in such arrangements. This negatively affects the client’s
ability to respond to changes in demand and to competitors’ strategic moves.
Loh and Venkatraman (1992) and Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) highlight
the economic consequences of vendor self interest and complacency once the
contract is agreed, requests for additional fees, and the consequences of clients
becoming locked into outdated services or technologies, increasingly incapable
of monitoring vendor performance. They also observe a consequential loss in
responsiveness to changes in demand.
2.5 Innovation
Given the emphasis placed on the potential benefits of outsourcing for innova-
tion, particularly within the KIBS literature. Surprisingly few empirical studies
have actually been conducted to date. With regards to IT outsourcing, there is
the ‘CIO’s Exclusive Outsourcing and Innovation Survey’ (Overby 2007). Two
main findings arise from this online survey of 290 senior technology executives.
First, only 24% of executives believe that outsourcing contributes to IT
innovation (versus 76% for insourcing). Second, significantly more executives
are dissatisfied with the levels of innovation generated by long distance global
outsourcing (off-shoring), compared with domestic outsourcing. This survey
is interesting but highlights the problems with the research in this field—it
lacks detailed analysis, rigor in terms of its research method, and focuses on IT
sourcing in general (not total outsourcing specifically). Additional empirical
research is required for a deeper understanding of the relationship between
diverse forms of outsourcing and innovation.
Turning to non-IT outsourcing, there is Gianelle and Tattara’s (2007) study
of total outsourcing by textile, clothing and footwear manufacturers in the
Veneto region of Italy. Their findings are very much in line with studies
on the total outsourcing of IT services. Gianelle and Tattara have a panel
sample that contains 48 joint stock companies, based in the Veneto area. These
are mainly medium-size firms which have delocalised important phases of
production. Gianelle and Tattara’s statistical analysis identifies a one-off short
run cost reduction as Italian labour is substituted by cheaper foreign labour.
However, they find that outsourcing firms achieve zero long run productivity
gains. Gianelle and Tattara explain that this is due to the fact that service
providers’ machinery and production techniques do not improve over time.
In other words, Smithian specialisation of the production process has not led
to innovation or productivity improvements in the contractor firms. Indeed,
Gianelle and Tattara report that there are documented cases of the machines
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previously used in the Veneto area being shipped abroad to be used by
foreign contractors. Gianelle and Tattara observe that the reorganisation of
production may bring about organisational innovations in foreign contactors
in the future, but that these have not happened to date. Only when this occurs
will there be long term improvements in productivity.
To briefly summarise, existing empirical evidence indicates there are two
key disadvantages to long term, total outsourcing contracts. First, total out-
sourcing relationships reduce the capacity of client firms to engage in organi-
sational innovation, i.e. to organise and develop new organisational structures
that better capture the positive externalities that exist between interrelated
activities. This is because control over the specification and development of
outsourced activities is passed over to the contractor. Second, in drawing up
long term contracts, clients effectively give monopoly power to the contrac-
tor. The evidence indicates that specialisation advantages and productivity
improvements that accrue to the contractor are not passed on to the client
but are kept by the contractor in the form of higher profits. Taken together,
the empirical evidence indicates that total outsourcing relationships, fixed over
long term contracts, has a detrimental impact on clients’ productivity growth.
3 Optimal search, organisational innovation, and outsourcing
Having discussed the existing empirical data, let us next consider the link
between total outsourcing, organisational innovation, and productivity growth.
While the empirical data indicates a negative long run correlation between
total outsourcing and productivity growth, and between total outsourcing
and organisational innovation, the data does not provide information on
the complex links between total outsourcing, organisational innovation, and
productivity growth.6 In this section of the paper we build on the so-called
‘modular theory of the firm’, which brings together Adam Smith’s principles
of specialisation and the division of labour with Herbert Simon’s work on
decomposition and complexity. This theory is important because it provides
a platform for the model of organisational innovation and sourcing that is
presented in Section 4.
Organisational innovation is a key source of firm total factor productivity
growth (Harberger 1998). Indeed, the idea that organisational innovation
drives economic growth dates back to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Smith
1776). Chandler (1980) suggests that organisational innovation, leading to the
more efficient use of existing resource inputs, accounts for up to one-third
of all firm productivity growth in the US since the 1860s. This can take the
6See Brock’s (1999) discussion of ‘unconditional objects’. Empirical regularities provide us with
information on the properties of stationary distributions. They do not provide information on the
dynamics of the stochastic processes that actually generated them.
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form of new management structures, the development of new internal routines
and work practices, new supply chain relationships, strategic alliances, and
outsourcing.
The goal of organisational change is the identification of new organisational
architectures that more effectively solve two key problems faced by managers:
the ‘fundamental coordination problem’, and the ‘agency problem’. The ‘fun-
damental coordination problem’ concerns the effective organisation of value-
adding activities and information flows within the firm. New organisational
architectures improve productivity by more effectively bringing together the
externalities that exist between value-adding activities. These externalities ex-
ist between a set of related R&D, design, production, and marketing activities
within a firm (Langlois 2002), and between the activities of different firms
along the supply chain (Jacobides and Winter 2005). Hence, the productivity of
a particular organisational architecture depends on how effectively it enables
a firm to manage (a) the externalities that exist between a set of in-house
activities, and (b) the externalities that exist between its in-house activities and
the activities of its suppliers/clients. The ‘agency problem’ concerns the ability
of management to realise and enforce coordination and control in production,
both internally and across the boundary of the firm.7 As discussed in our review
of the empirical literature, there are costs involved in organising and managing
internally held activities, and in establishing and managing interfaces between
internally held activities and the activities of suppliers/clients. Altering the
sourcing of activities changes these internal and external managerial overhead
costs.
The link between organisational innovation and product/process innovation
has been discussed by Chandler (1962, 1977), von Tunzelmann (1993), and
Barras (1986). Organisational change is stimulated by new process technolo-
gies that require new internal routines and new work practices. The adoption
of new IT systems is a particular case in point. IT adoption and development
invariably requires organisational restructuring and process innovation in
back office activities. It may also stimulate the development of new/improved
services that require changes in client-facing front office competences and
routines (Barras 1986).
Depending on their impact on internal and external coordination costs,
different types and vintages of IT will stimulate verticalisation or de-
verticalisation. A particularly notable feature of internet-based IT, such as
websites, internet-based EDI, and extranets, is the radical expansion of techni-
cal opportunities for the outsourcing of production, and a significant lowering
of external coordination costs. The impact on internal administration costs,
through applications such as intranets, is far more restricted. This asymmet-
rical impact on the costs of internal and external coordination (the agency
problem), and on the feasible opportunities for production and the division
of labour (the fundamental coordination problem), has altered the relative
7Issues of agency and control in the firm are addressed in detail by Reinstaller (2007).
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efficacy of outsourcing vis-à-vis performing activities in-house. The conse-
quence is a flattening of organisational hierarchies in large firms, associated
with vertical disintegration, and individual business units are becoming smaller
in size.
The current situation contrasts sharply with the impact of previous vintages
of IT, such as those discussed by Chandler. Calculators, typewriters, Hollerith
electric tabulating machines, and book-keeping machines were only applicable
to internal administrative activities (Yates 2000; Reinstaller and Hölzl 2004).
Consequently, these ITs significantly reduced internal coordination costs while
having little or no impact on external coordination costs. These earlier IT
technologies were essential to the development of the modern hierarchical
organisation, which occurred between the 1860s and the 1930s. Indeed, large
corporations were the key purchasers of IT technologies (as they are today).
Further improvements in these ITs enhanced the ability of large u-form and
m-form businesses to grow in size. The result was a tendency towards vertical
integration as more and more activities were brought in-house.
These stylised facts provide us with a transmission mechanism between
the adoption of new IT, organisational innovation, and outsourcing. The
transmission mechanism is important because it enables one to consider the
coordination costs and agency costs of alternative types of IT and the effect
these have on organisational innovation and sourcing.
The modular theory of the firm enables one to explore the relationship
between organisational innovation, outsourcing, and productivity growth. This
theory is founded on the twin principles of increasing specialisation and the
modularisation of complex organisational structures. This brings together
Adam Smith’s principles of specialisation and the division of labour (Smith
1776) with Herbert Simon’s discussion of the decomposability of complex
problems (Simon 1996, 2002). Key contributions to the theory have been made
by Langlois and Robertson (1995), Baldwin and Clark (1997), Langlois (2002,
2003a), Marengo and Dosi (2005), and Baldwin (2007).
Simon (1996, 2002) addressed the generic issue of problem-solving activity
within complex systems and suggested that modularisation is the means by
which problems are made more manageable. Modularisation involves the
grouping of interconnected elements within a system, to create distinct sub-
components (module). In addition to reducing the complexity of a problem,
by breaking it down into a smaller number of sub-components, modularisation
means improvements can be made to just one sub-component of the system,
avoiding the need to simultaneously change all the other parts of the system
(which would be the case if there were no modularisation). There is a cost,
however. This arises through the need to establish and maintain interfaces
that ensure each sub-component is compatible with all other sub-components.
Interfaces ensure that the whole structure functions in an integrated way, while
maintaining a high degree of independence for each sub-component.
Translating this approach to the current discussion, organisational innova-
tion is a search process involving the development of new organisational archi-
tectures that create/destroy (1) modular components containing interrelated
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value-adding activities, (2) the administrative interfaces between modular
components, and (3) the internal/external sourcing of these modules individual
activities, and even whole modules of interrelated activities.
In discussing the link between the modularity of an organisational structure
and TFP improvements, a theoretical link is made to Adam Smith’s principle of
specialisation through the division of labour. Smith’s classic example of the pin
factory in the ‘Wealth of Nations’ is, in fact, a discussion of one way in which
complexity can be tackled—by breaking down and dividing a range of com-
plex value-adding processes into a finer set of specialised functions. Through
specialisation, the efficiency of production is raised. Cooperation is a neces-
sary prerequisite for specialisation. Each activity must be carefully orches-
trated. Workers become complements to one another, rather than substitutes
(Leijonhufvud 1986). This coordination function must be hardwired (to a
greater or lesser degree) into the spatial and temporal interfaces between
specialised operations and specialised operatives (Langlois 2003b). Smith
made it clear that the specialisation principle is generic and holds in all aspects
of business organisation (Langlois 2003b). This includes decisions about what
to produce, the inputs that are required, what should be produced in-house
or bought in markets, the geographical location of production, sales etc.,
the appropriate organisation structure of the firm, and the information and
communication requirements of the organisation.
Placing Smith’s principle of specialisation within Simon’s framework of
decomposable complex systems, we see that the problem facing managers
is how to decompose a set of interrelated, value-adding activities into a set
of modular subsystems and, second, how to coordinate these subsystems.
An optimal organisational structure is one in which positive externalities
between activities are maximised while negative externalities are minimised.
This is what drives the process of modularisation, determining the elements
to be placed within modules, and the interfaces between modules. Through
this modularisation process, the interactions between a set of activities are
identified and transformed into a nearly decomposable system.8
Let us now consider the relationship between organisational innovation
and total factor productivity (TFP). There exist two potential sources for
TFP improvement. The first is ‘system economies’, of the type discussed by
Nightingale et al. (2003). Through the development of new interfaces that
improve control of interactions between a given set of modules, managers
improve TFP. In practice, this entails the development of more effective
managerial service activities to integrate and control a the set of productive
activities currently performed by the firm. Through improved managerial
control, the firm approaches a given productivity frontier, improving TFP. The
second source of TFP improvement is organisational innovation. Increasing
8A fully decomposable system is one in which all externalities can be located within modular sub-
systems. In a nearly decomposable system, externalities exist between subsystems as well as within
sub-systems.
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the modularity of the organisational structure pushes the productivity fron-
tier forwards. Organisational innovation may either involve the splitting of
administrative tasks into a greater number of organisational modules or, al-
ternatively, the integrating of organisational modules to increase control over
the modular productive elements and their interaction. A superior organisa-
tional architecture improves the coordination and control of materials, funds,
services, and information that flows through the complex supply, production
and distribution activities of the firm, raising TFP.
Organisational innovation is an ongoing process: innovation begets fur-
ther innovation over time. Through experimentation, managers gain a better
understanding of the externalities that exist between activities, and see new
opportunities that can be afforded by breaking down ‘departmental silos’ and
creating novel synergies between activities. For instance, creating stronger
interactions between the sales and production departments may lead to new
product opportunities. These, in turn, may provide economies of scope and,
if the firm is able to develop new markets, economies of scale. As Baldwin
and Clark (1997) observe, the more modular an organisation’s architecture,
the greater the likelihood of stimulating further modular innovation. The
process of organisational innovation also explores new sourcing possibilities.
To quote Baldwin, “Modularizations create new thin crossing points where
transaction costs are low. These new module boundaries provide points of entry
for competitors and breakpoints where vertically integrated firms and industries
may split apart. . . Strategies, knowledge and technologies all change over time,
and the location of transactions changes as well.” (Baldwin 2007, p.4, italics
added).
To summarise, organisational innovation is a search process by which the
firm develops new organisational structures that capture, within a nearly
decomposable system, the externalities that exist between activities. This is
achieved by creating modules in which the positive externalities of closely
related activities are maximised, and by developing interfaces that maximise
the externalities between modules. Additionally, organisational innovation is
an ongoing process of experimentation with the internal and external sourcing
of modules. The sourcing decision and the opportunities for the division of
labour are, in part, technologically determined. Of particular note is the effect
of new IT on agency costs and on internal/external coordination costs. These
affect the direction of organisational innovation, outsourcing decisions, and
long run productivity. We develop a simulation model in order to examine the
complex interactions between new IT, organisational innovation, outsourcing,
and TFP. The core features of this model are discussed in the next section of
the paper.
4 A model of organisational innovation, IT, and total outsourcing
Empirically grounded modelling uses stylised empirical facts about the micro
features of the system to inform the modelling process. Further, one or more
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industry/macro level observations or stylised facts are used as a benchmark to
test the validity of the simulated outputs that are generated by the model.9
Our model of organisational innovation is informed by five stylised facts
discussed in Section 3:
1. organisational innovation is concerned with identifying and capturing the
externalities between a set of value-adding activities within organisational
modules,
2. maximising externalities also requires improved managerial control of the
interfaces between modules,
3. there is an essential connection between the scope of organisational inno-
vation and potential productivity growth,
4. total outsourcing transfers the control of modules to a service provider,
and
5. new IT alters the technological opportunities for internal/external sourc-
ing, and the relative cost of sourcing activities internally/externally.
The model also uses empirical evidence on the strategic process of innova-
tion and outsourcing furnished by Tayles and Drury (2001). This was gleaned
through an action research project with a major UK engineering company. The
decision structure identified by Tayles and Drury is replicated in the model, in
a slightly simplified form (Fig. 2).
First, an activity is randomly selected (box 1). This may, for example,
be a bottleneck that has been identified. Management then consider alter-
native innovation strategies to improve TFP (box 2). The options are (a)
organisational restructuring, taking the form of modular change, or (b) the
incremental improvement of existing modules. The former is an exploration
strategy: the firm actively explores the dimensions of the search landscape (i.e.
to identify the globally optimum design) by altering the modular structure of
the organisation. The latter is an exploitation strategy: it seeks to incrementally
improve performance by exploiting the current set of resources contained
within the existing modular configuration.
Managers are boundedly rational, in that they do not know the character-
istics of the stochastic process that generates incremental and radical innova-
tions, or the final payoffs to each strategy. For each strategy, management must
estimate the likely outcome of an exploration or an exploitation strategy10
based on the degree of organisational decomposition that is required (box
3), on production costs (box 6), on managerial overheads and coordination
costs (box 7), and on profits, given expectations of price changes and demand
elasticity (box 8).
Following Tayles and Drury, the sourcing decision is the next step in the
decision process (boxes 11 to 18). Two parameters are significant here. The
9For an in-depth discussion of empirically grounded modelling, the interested reader is referred to
the special issue of Computational Economics edited by Birchenhall et al. (2007).
10March (1991) discusses the long term need for firms to simultaneously hold exploration and
exploitation strategies.











































































Fig. 2 Flowchart of the decision making structure. Based on Tayles and Drury (2001)
first is the management’s propensity to outsource (‘OSP’ in box 12). This risk
attitude to outsourcing is an exogenously determined variable. It represents a
persistent managerial trait. This is likely to depend on a number of factors, such
as the risk attitude of the individual managers that make up the management
board and the power of these individual managers to influence decisions. The
outsourcing propensity (OSP) may also be subject to external influences, such
as media and consultancy reports extolling the potential virtues of outsourcing,
and to the influence of sourcing decisions made by competitors or by firms in
other industries. By altering the value of this parameter, one can analyse the
effect of different propensities to outsource on organisational innovation and,
hence, long run TFP.
For a given outsourcing propensity (OSP), a draw is made on a uniformly
distributed random variable. This indicates whether the option to outsource a
module is available (box 11). In the model we assume that KIBS providers have
cost advantages in the delivery of some (though not all) business activities.
Hence, the ‘optimal organisational design’ for the contractor is not a corner
solution but some combination of insourced and outsourced activities.
The process of ‘total outsourcing’ involves a KIBS-client contract that
specifies the delivery of a specific service of a fixed quality and a fixed price.
Following the empirical evidence discussed in Section 2, once the outsourcing
firm enters a total outsourcing contract, it shuts down its own productive
activity in this area.
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A second exogenous factor is the type of IT that is available. This is
modelled as an exogenous parameter that determines the relative impact of
IT on external and internal coordination costs. By altering the values of this
parameter we are able to analyse the impact of IT on organisational innova-
tion, insourcing/outsourcing and TFP for two scenarios. The first scenario is
that of early IT technologies, such as those discussed by Chandler, that reduce
internal coordination costs more than external coordination costs. The second
scenario is that of internet-based ITs, which reduce external coordination costs
far more than they reduce internal coordination costs.
The decision to adopt a new organisational architecture means the firm
implements a particular organisational strategy and—in the case of a modu-
lar innovation—a particular sourcing decision (boxes 15, 16, 17). Using this
new organisational architecture, the firm engages in production and sells the
produce on the market.
The boundedly rational firm adaptively learns from its experience. Using
information on the resulting payoffs, the management updates its expectations
about the effectiveness of the innovation strategies that it employs (box 18).
The probability of choosing a particular strategy in the next period endoge-
nously changes as a consequence of this reinforcement learning. As described
by Arthur (1991), each strategy has a weighted probability that it will be chosen
by the management. This weighted probability increases or decreases over
time according to how more or less successful it proves to be in improving
performance.
The extent of organisational specialisation ultimately depends on a number
of demand and supply side factors. On the demand side, it depends on the
extent of the market (i.e. increasing levels of population and/or income), and
the degree of competition (the elasticity of demand) (Young 1928). On the
supply side, it is affected by the availability of IT, which enables activities to
be subdivided and coordinated in new and better ways (the agency problem).
Together, these demand and supply side factors determine the extent to which
activities can be effectively modularised and technical hierarchies established.
Let us consider some specific aspects of the model in greater detail.
4.1 Organisational architectures
The modular architecture of an organisation can be modelled using the NK
approach of Kauffman and Altenberg.11 We assume the administration of a
firm delivers θ services to productive routines that generate a firm’s value-
added. The quality of these services has an impact on the performance of
productive routines. These services are produced by organisational routines m1
and m2, which produce a subset of all services. These two routines are linked
together through a coordination routine ma1. More generally, the organisation
11See Altenberg (1995), Wagner and Altenberg (1996), Kauffman et al. (2000), and Schilling
(2000).
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of a firm consists of a set of nt organisational modules or routines mi, grouped
by means of nt−1 organisational routines maj into an organisational architecture
dt =
〈
m1, m2, . . . , mnt ; ma1, ma2, . . . , mant−1
〉
.12 Since the division of labour inside
the firm can vary over time, nt carries the time index t. The array dt ∈ D
corresponds to a particular organisational architecture of the administrative
activities that are in use within the firm at time t. It is drawn from a finite space
D of possible organisational architectures, which the management explores
over time.
Each of the routines used in an architecture consists of λi sub-routines or
mi =< xh >λih=1; λi is allowed to vary across routines. These routines produce a
vector θ of k services for the productive routines that are operated by the firm.
Together these output characteristics meet well defined customer needs in the
market in which the firm operates. In our model, the organisation of a firm is
therefore defined through the characteristics of an organisational architecture
dt given by nt organisational modules mi, and k service characteristics. The
number of modules nt is therefore a measure of the degree of modularity of
the organisational architecture.
Strong externalities exist between the sub-routines xh in each module mi,
i.e. the performance of each sub-routine φ(xh)t at time step t affects the perfor-
mance of all other sub-routines in the module, and its performance is in turn
influenced by all other sub-routines φ(x−h)t in the module. Consequently, the
performance of all sub-routines φ(x−h)t change if φ(xh)t changes. It also follows
that a sub-set ki ⊂ k of output characteristics is directly and indirectly affected
by all xh sub-routines in a module mi. The overall performance φ(mi)t of a
module mi is therefore the result of negative and positive feedbacks between
the sub-routines it contains. These interdependencies reflect a situation that is
typical in team production, for example. The skills and activities of the team
members are closely complementary and integrated and so, if one member
performs under par, the efficiency of all other members is affected.
Externalities between sub-routines mean changing a particular service θ i in
module mi will alter the performance of connected sub-routines and services.
In the simulations we will determine φ(mi)t by drawing λi values from a
uniform distribution with φ(xh)t → Uniform[0,1] and calculating the average
over the λi sub-routines. The impact of all n service producing administrative
routines on firm performance is then given by, t = 1n
∑n
i=1 φ(mi)t.13
Smithian specialisation involves splitting an existing module into two; each
of the new modules focussing on producing a distinct service. Coordinating
these new modules requires the introduction of an interface—an adminis-
12A routine is the process whereby a vector of inputs is transformed into a vector of outputs
through the use of specific knowledge, skills and modes of coordination. See Nelson and Winter
(1982, chapter 5). The terms module and routine are used interchangeably in this paper. We
assume that routines are somewhat self-contained elements of the production process.
13This representation of organisational designs and their impact on the performance of productive
activities corresponds to a generalised NK model (Altenberg 1995).
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trative service that coordinates the interaction between modules. Thus, mi
modules are linked by maj managerial services. As the degree of hierarchy
increases, so coordination overheads increase. This captures Simon’s (1996)
idea of increasing modularity as a means of solving complex problems. For
a given set of internally-held activities (sub-routines), firms develop modules
that contain inter-related activities, and separate out (into different modules)
distinct sets of activities. By maximising positive externalities between inter-
related activities, and minimising negative externalities between distinct activ-
ities, a firm can raise the TFP of a given set of productive inputs. This is our
understanding of the ‘system economies’ described by Nightingale et al. (2003).
4.2 Organisational learning: exploitation vs. exploration
Managers use a set of S strategies to explore the space of organisational
architectures D. The strategy space S = (s1, s2, s3) consists of three strategies,
each of which is used with probability μ j at each time step t. Innovation
strategy s1 corresponds to incremental exploitation, driven by learning by
doing. Here all values for φ(xh)t+1 are redrawn. Performance improves if the
average over the λi sub-routines increases.
Strategies s2 and s3 are exploration strategies. These involve changing the
organisational architecture of the firm. A firm identifies and neutralises one
or more complementarities that bind sub-routines into a module. It then has
one of two options. First, it can split a more complex activity into a number
of less complex routines, and redesign its organisation accordingly. This de-
composition strategy s2, is the Smithian specialisation strategy discussed above.
Henceforth we will refer to this as ‘splitting’. The alternative option is to reor-
ganise smaller production and organisation routines into larger, more complex
modules. In this way the firm can explore the existence of externalities between
previously unrelated routines. We will refer to this integration strategy, s3, as
‘job-enrichment’.
Both s2 and s3 lead to a change in the organisational architecture as poorly
performing routines are replaced by better performing ones.14 In this case,
all performance values φ(xh)t+1 for the elements in the new module(s) are
redrawn. If their joint average increases, this corresponds to a performance
improvement. These strategies affect the performance t of productive rou-
tines through system economies. By improving control of productive routines,
they push the productivity of a given technology towards its limit.
According to the modular theory of the firm, an increase in system modu-
larity also leads to an improvement in the innovation rate. Modularity allows
a better understanding of the workings of a system, making it easier to recom-
bine routines, increasing the probability of discovering better ways of doing
things. We will assume that, depending on the degree of decomposition of the
14Wagner and Altenberg (1996) have discussed decomposition and integration as potential
evolutionary mechanisms of change within genetics.
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administration of the firm given by the number of routines n, the likelihood of
discovering better ways of organising the production process increases if the
firm invests in this exploration process. This will push ahead the performance
t of productive routines by a factor (1 + εt), where εt+1 = εt (1 + τ). In the
simulation, parameter τ has a small positive value as does εt at t = 0. The
probability of the firm making an innovation εt is determined by a Poisson
process with an arrival rate α. Following Silverberg and Verspagen (1994), we
assume the firm’s investments have first increasing and then decreasing returns.
This is captured by a logistic representation of the arrival rate given by
αt+1 = αminαmax
αmin + (αmax − αmin)−(r∗nt)
(1)
αmin represents a small autonomous probability of making a fortuitous inno-
vation without investing in this type of innovation, αmax corresponds to an
asymptotic saturation level of the arrival rate. As can be seen, this process
depends on the propensity to invest r and on the degree of decomposition.
This captures the innovation potential.
The firm maximises profits 	dt (st). Its strategic behaviour is given by
the probability distribution over the three alternative innovation strategies.
This ‘policy mix’ st =
[
μ1,ts1 μ2,ts2 μ3,ts3
]′, with μ1,t + μ2,t + μ3,t = 1, evolves
through reinforcement learning, given some initial probabilities μ j,t=0. This
probability should not be interpreted as conscious randomisation. Rather, it
indicates (from the perspective of the outside observer) how likely it is that
the decision maker will choose each of the three strategies. The reinforcement
learning dynamics are those of Arthur (1991); each strategy is allocated a
probability based to its past contribution to the performance of the firm.




























t−1 indicates the change in the performance
improvement between two time steps t and t − 1, when strategy s j was used.
From Eq. 2 we see the reinforcement mechanism. Strategies that have raised
profitability in the past have a higher probability of being chosen again.
Strategies that have not been as successful in raising profitability have a lower
probability of being selected in each time step. Note that this method of
probability updating shares certain features with a Polya Urn. There is path
dependency in strategic choice, opening the way for chance events in the early
selections to build up and have long term consequences. We will return to this
issue in Section 5.
4.3 Costs of production for a given organisational architecture
and information technologies
To simplify, we assume that white-collar routines are not productive in them-
selves but improve the utilisation and development of the firm’s productive
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resources. More precisely, we assume that the services produced by an admin-
istrative activity mi have an impact on the performance of productive routines,
φ(mi)t. As previously mentioned, the impact on the unit costs of productive
routines by all n modules is given by t. In order to run simulations, we
choose a simple and well-behaved functional form to represent the effect of
performance improvements on the unit costs of productive routines—one that
captures the central ideas while ensuring unstable outcomes are avoided. We
specify this as
vcdt = wplpe−(1+εt)t (3)
where wp is the average wage bill per unit of output paid for productive
routines, and l p is the unit labour requirement.
Two types of routine govern the administration of the firm. The first type of
routine produces managerial services for productive activities contained within
a module. The second type of routine coordinates the interaction between
these managerial services and modules. Outsourcing involves the outsourcing
of the first type of routine as well as the productive activities within a module.
We assume the number of services a module produces is proportional to its
skill intensity, i.e. the more services an activity produces, the higher are the
skills required to carry them out. This implies that the average wage paid
to these routines is higher than to routines where only a few services are
produced. For simplicity we assume that the unit wage cost of producing one
service to productive routines is the same as carrying out one coordination
task.
As discussed earlier in the paper, information technologies affect coordina-
tion costs. What is more, different vintages of IT have different relative impacts
on internal and external coordination costs. Total administrative overhead
costs are then defined by
ocdt =
(










where la and lc are the unit labour requirements for service and coordination
routines, w is the going wage rate paid per ‘skill unit’, λ¯ is the average number
of services produced in each administrative activity, p are the prices paid
for outsourced routines, νint and νext are the number of internal and external
coordination routines, and θ int and θ ext reflect the impact of IT use on internal
and external coordination costs respectively. Variable z (0 ≤ z ≤ 1) weights the
unit costs of administrative services produced in-house and those externally
produced by their respective share in the total number of services that are
produced.
Suppose the firm has a propensity r to invest part of its revenues to
organisational exploration, i.e. through the modularity of its administration.
These costs are then given by
rct = rptqt (5)
where pt and qt are the prices charged and the quantities sold at a time step t.
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If a specific module mi is outsourced, the contractor’s unit cost of production
is





where γ reflects the comparative cost advantage service firm  has in producing
the services of administrative activity mi. In the simulations we assume that γ
→ N(1, σ 2), i.e. the cost advantage is normally distributed around a mean of
1 with some variance σ 2. Variables la, and lc, reflect the relative unit labour
requirements for service producing and coordination routines, and νint, and
νext, give the number of internal and external coordination routines the service
supplier has to manage. Assuming the supplier has some market power, such
that it is able to charge a positive mark-up ξ over costs, the unit price for the
services of supplier  to the outsourcing firm is given by
p = (1 + ξ) cs (7)
In line with the empirical evidence, we assume that, once a module is out-
sourced, suppliers charge a fixed price for their services. Contract suppliers
may enjoy Smithian specialisation advantages and/or scale economies as they
grow, but these cost benefits are not passed on, in the form of lower prices, to
the client firm. As discussed in Section 2, the empirical evidence suggests that
markets are thin and that the suppliers of business services are typically larger
and have more market power than their customers. Consequently, the market
for outsourced business services is imperfectly competitive.
4.4 Profits




where pt is the price the firm charges at time t, Is is the amount of income
customers spend on the firm’s product, qt is the firm’s output and η (η > 1), is
the price elasticity of demand. Following standard theory, the optimum output
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(10)
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by reducing unit costs of production. In our model this is achieved by pursuing
different strategies st of organisational innovation. The term ct reflects fixed
capital costs. Given a constant capital–output ratio, the firm must invest or
disinvest as output changes.
4.5 The innovation and outsourcing decisions
Decisions to conduct organisational innovation and outsource depend on eco-





that the new organisational architecture d′t+1 is likely to generate,
and compares this with the profit generated by the current architecture. The
decision rule for adopting a new organisational architecture d′t+1 is given by
the inequalities:
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Depending on the management strategy, the firm has a certain propensity to
pursue outsourcing such that, given strategy parameter os (0 ≤ os ≤ 1), it
calculates the expected profits of outsourcing services to other firms, leading
to an organisational architecture d′′t+1 with probability pros

















These are the decision rules the firm follows in order to maximise profitability
at each moment in time.
5 Results
Using this model, let us consider the relationship between total outsourcing,
organisational innovation, and productivity growth in two scenarios. In sce-
nario 1, new IT technologies have a large impact on internal coordination
costs θ int. This is the Chandlerian scenario in which early vintages of office
technology and IT significantly reduce internal coordination costs while having
little or no impact on external coordination costs. In scenario 2, new IT
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technologies have a large impact on external coordination costs θ ext. This
is the internet based IT scenario that we see today. For each scenario, we
examine how differential reductions in internal and external coordination
costs affect organisational innovation, the sourcing of activities, and long run
productivity.
In addition to θ int and θ ext, an important variable in our model is the manage-
ment’s propensity to outsource osp. As discussed in Section 4, this is treated
as an exogenous variable. The empirical evidence shows that outsourcing is
not part of a long run innovation strategy but is driven by expectations based
on consultancy and/or media promises, and by short run cost cutting goals.
In the simulations presented here, the propensity to outsource is fixed at an
average value (0.5), with an initial division of labour of ten administrative
activities. In addition to the propensity to outsource, the decision to outsource
is conditional on there being an available supplier who is cheaper than in-house
production. At the end of this section we report on sensitivity tests that have
been conducted on this parameter and on the initial division of labour.
The parameter values used in the simulations are reported in Table 1 of
the Appendix. The results present averages over 200 differently seeded runs.
Each run consists of 400 iterations. Sensitivity analysis examines the robustness
of results with regards to initial random seedings (Birchenhall et al. 2007).
During each iteration, one routine in the technology-characteristics map is
drawn randomly, and an innovation strategy is chosen with a probability μ j,t.
Performance values for the selected routine are then re-drawn. Furthermore,
we initialise the model so that the probabilities for each of the alternative
innovation and sourcing strategies are initially the same. In this way one
can control for the propensity to outsource osp, and exclude the possibility
that differences in initial managerial strategies influence the final outcome.
Importantly, this also excludes the possibility that the results are driven by bad
management practices. For instance, it is not just badly managed firms that
engage in outsourcing. Strategies are selected given a set of technological and
transaction costs, and by the firm’s past experience of using these strategies.
The set of simulation results generated for scenarios 1 and 2 are presented
in Fig. 3. The bold line indicates the mean value for each parameter setting
over the 200 scenario 1 runs and over the 200 scenario 2 runs. The thin
dashed lines represent the 99% confidence interval around the mean. Note
that the dash-dot-dash lines are the scenario 1 results, i.e. where there are low
internal communication costs θ int for a given outsourcing propensity of 0.5.
The unbroken lines are the scenario 2 results, i.e. where there are low external
communication costs θ ext for a given outsourcing propensity of 0.5. The plots
provide information on average productivity, average profits, average unit
costs for managerial services, and the extent of the division of labour in the
administration of the firm (the depth of hierarchy) for scenarios 1 and 2.
The first, and most important, observation is that the results reproduce
the stylised facts of the outsourcing productivity paradox. The average long
term productivity of a firm is lower when it heavily engages in outsourcing,
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Fig. 3 Simulation results for scenarios 1 and 2
encouraged by an IT technology that significantly reduces external coordina-
tion costs. The explanation for the paradox within our model is as follows.
The managers of the firm are learning myopically over time, through pure
learning-by-doing. That is to say, they do not know the true payoffs to each
of the different strategies at the outset. The firm must gather information
by observing the payoffs that are generated by past decisions. Under these
circumstances, internet ITs make it attractive to engage in outsourcing because
they reduce external coordination costs. One consequence of outsourcing is a
reduction in the depth of hierarchy. This leads, at least in the beginning, to a
reduction in overhead costs. This is the short run cost effect discussed in the
empirical literature.
We also see, from Fig. 3, that productivity grows initially. Reinforcement
learning means the initial success, in terms of reducing initial costs and
gains in productivity, increases the probability that managers will choose the
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outsourcing strategy next time. Each time a chosen strategy increases profits, a
higher weight is placed on that option, and a lower weight is placed on each of
the alternative options. This sets up path dependency and the potential for
lock-in to sub-optional sourcing strategies. For example, if the outsourcing
strategy is chosen in the next period, and it again has a positive impact on
cutting costs and on raising productivity, this further raises the probability of
managers choosing to outsource next time, and so on.
Of course, we have an advantage over the management of the firm in that
we can run the model under a number of different scenarios. From Fig. 3, we
see that long term productivity growth would be higher if managers choose a
non-outsourcing strategy. But the managers cannot ‘see’ what would happen
if they pursue an alternative strategic path. Diminishing returns mean that, as
a firm continues along the outsourcing path, productivity growth starts to fall
and can even stagnate. The upshot is that managers, focused on the short run
cost cutting benefits of outsourcing, succeed in reducing costs but unwittingly
reduce the long run innovation potential of the firm as well.
Lower potential productivity growth is due to the total outsourcing
relationship. A decision to outsource places an activity/service beyond the
control of the outsourcing firm for the remainder of the simulation run. This
reduces the number of modular elements that are under the firm’s control, re-
stricting its capacity for future organisational innovation and, hence, the prob-
ability of identifying a more efficient organisational hierarchy. This directly
affects long term productivity growth because long term TFP improvement
depends on the ability to engage in the modular reorganisation of value adding
in our model.
The results also support the Chandlerian story of the impact of new
technology on hierarchal structure—at least for the types and vintages of IT
that Chandler is considering in the period between the 1860s and the 1960s.
Office and information technologies such calculators, typewriters, Hollerith
electric tabulating machines, and book-keeping machines were only applicable
to internal administrative activities thus had a significant impact on reducing
internal coordination costs and little or no impact on external coordination
costs. In the model, these technologies support the development of increased
modularity in the administration of the firm. As activities become more spe-
cialised, it is easier to improve the quality of managerial services to those value-
adding activities. Importantly, the long run potential for radical organisational
innovations is exploited successfully. The results of the model indicate that
long run productivity under scenario 1 outperforms that under scenario 2, i.e.
of total outsourcing relationships underpinned by internet based ITs.
Taken together, the results accord with the findings of the empirical studies
discussed in Section 3. Having said this, one should observe that long run
productivity levels when external coordination costs are low are close to the
levels that are generated when external coordination costs are high. The
outcome depends on the propensity of the firm to invest in radical organi-
sational innovation. This suggests that, where a firm chooses to moderately
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engage in outsourcing, influenced by the impact of IT in external coordination
costs, it should scale up its investment in radical organisational innovations, as
these enable it to better exploit the long term TFP potential of organisational
innovation.
Finally, we report on the sensitivity analysis that has been conducted for the
current set of parameter values (see Table 1 of the Appendix). With regards
to the managerial propensity to outsource, sensitivity analysis indicates the
above set of results hold when the propensity to outsource is greater than
0.2. When the outsourcing probability is close to zero, the negative effects
of total outsourcing become weaker and the results begin to resemble those
for scenario 1. This is because the probability for management to engage in
outsourcing is lower and, as a result, organisational modules are retained in
house, enabling greater scope for further modular innovation to occur over
time.
The sensitivity analysis indicates that the results are also sensitive with
respect to the initial division of labour (i.e. the initial degree of modularity)
in the firm’s hierarchy. With a low initial division of labour, the results are
rather similar to those discussed above, but the adjustment process is much
slower. In scenario 1, it takes much longer for a minimum division of labour
to develop which is sufficient for the recombination potential needed to drive
the innovation process. In scenario 2 situations, firms quickly outsource and,
as there are very few modules to outsource, productivity and profits are very
sluggish from the outset. Hence, the sensitivity analysis confirms the robustness
of the results presented in this section.
6 Conclusions and directions for further research
The paper has addressed the outsourcing paradox through an investigation of
the link between organisational innovation, total outsourcing, and long run
productivity growth. The outsourcing paradox is the striking thesis that has
emerged from recent empirical research. In order to investigate this paradox,
the first part of the paper carefully summarised the empirical findings and
identified a set key stylised facts. These stylised facts provide the starting point
for an explanation of the paradox. We have highlighted two key factors. The
first is the nature of total outsourcing—the predominant form of outsouring
relationship—and its impact on the long run potential for organisational
innovation. The second key factor that we have highlighted is the role played
by new IT sytems. By altering internal and external communication costs,
technologies affect both the direction of organisational innovation and the
sourcing decision.
In order to explore these key factors we presented a model of organisational
innovation that explicitly models the relationship between organisational inno-
vation, total outsourcing, and long run productivity growth. Using this model,
we considered the short and long run impacts of outsourcing on organisational
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structure, on costs, and on long term productivity growth for two, alternative
IT scenarios.
The findings of the model clearly indicate the conditions under which
managers become locked-in to a low productivity growth trajectory. Managers
with a high propensity to outsource enjoy early gains in reducing short run
costs and are spurred on by the opportunities afforded by internet based IT.
Early success in raising profits, through the cutting of short run labour costs
and managerial overheads, spurs managers to engage in further outsourcing.
Managers in the model are myopic. On the basis of their own experiences,
they update information on the perceived payoffs to alternative sourcing
strategies. Given positive early experiences, i.e. that choosing to engage in
total outsourcing led to a rise in firm profits, a self-reinforcing mechanism is
established as managers are more likely to engage in total outsourcing next
time.
We know, from running the model under a set of alternative conditions, that
managers would enjoy higher long run productivity gains if they retained ac-
tivities in-house. This is because total outsourcing passes control of outsourced
activities to the contractor. The outsourced activities are no longer available
for splitting and recombining with other activities into new, more effective
organisational modules. Hence, the set of available options for organisational
innovation is cut each time management engages in outsourcing. Under total
outsourcing there is a real possibility of lock-in to a suboptimal organisational
hierarchy, for the firm does not have under its control the set of combinatorial
elements that are needed to establish the optimal organisational structure. The
findings provides a salutary warning for managers and policy-makers about the
potential long term implications of total outsourcing.
Looking forward, there is a need to extend the current analysis. The results
depend on a number of conditions. First, outsourcing is purely cost driven
and takes the form of a total outsourcing relationship. Potential interactions
between suppliers and service firms, as well as the exchange of competences,
may exist in other types of outsourcing relationships. In future research we
will consider, for instance, the effect of integrated outsourcing relationships
on organisational innovation and long run productivity. We expect that this
inquiry will further strengthen our argument that it is managerial control of
interrelated productive activities that matters, not ownership per se. Another
simplification in the current model is the assumption that the extent of the
market (demand) is given. Changing demand, for example, may lead to a more
complicated set of results over the course of a lifecycle. We will also consider
the effect of more competitive supply markets. Different learning environ-
ments are also likely to affect the results. Managers may, for example, learn
from the experiences of other firms, however imperfectly. Future research
will examine the extent to which this affects lock-in to a total outsourcing
trajectory. Finally, it is hoped that the current paper will stimulate further
research into the outsourcing paradox and raise awareness of this important
issue amongst businesses and policymakers.
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Appendix
Table 1 Parameter values that are used to calibrate the model
Variable Range/value
Efficiency of internal and external coordination Scenario with high external coordination
routines {θint, θext} costs {0,2}
Scenario with external coordination costs
lower than internal coordination costs {4,2}
Outsourcing propensity osp osp = 0.5
Total number of services F F = 100
Wage bill w W = 1
Performance improvement τ Draw fromN(0.01,0.0025) to initialize firm
parameter, constant over iterations
Supplier cost advantage γ Draw fromN(1,0.0625) to initialize firm
parameter, constant over iterations
Investment propensity r For each firm draw from N(0.02,0.0025),
constant over iterations
αmin, αmax αmin = 0.01 αmax = 1
l p 0.8
la la = FF+υint+νext
(
1 − l p
)
lc lc = νint+νextF+νint+νext
(
1 − l p
)
z z = F−NosF
Nos = number of outsourced services;∑
 λi, = Nos
la, la, = λi,λi,+νint,+νext,
lc, lc, = νint,+νext,λi,+νint,+νext,
Total consumer income allocated to the firm Is = 100
in each period Is
Elasticity of demand η Draw from uniform [1.05,1.5] to initialise firm
parameter, constant over iterations
Initial degree of decomposition of the n0 = 10
techno-organisational architecture n0
Average supplier mark-up ξ Draw from uniform [0,0.5] for each
outsourcing draw
μi,0, i = 1,2,3; μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 0.3¯, at t = 0
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